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‘International Terrorism’ as Conspiracy: Debating 
Terrorism in the League of Nations 
Ondrej Ditrych ∗ 
Abstract: »’Internationaler Terrorismus‘ als Verschwörung: Debatten über Ter-
rorismus im Völkerbund «. This paper aims at historicizing terrorism by focusing 
attention on how the current dominant discursive patterns, constituent ele-
ments of the ‘global terrorism’ dispositive, have come to existence. It brings to 
the fore the first robust international debate on terrorism which took place in 
the League of Nations following the Marseilles assassination (1934) and shows 
its conspiratorial features, many of which are detectable in the discourse of 
terrorism among states after 9/11. 
Keywords: terrorism, conspiracy, League of Nations, Marseilles, Foucault. 
1.  Introduction 
Less than an hour after Alexander I Karadordevic, the king of Yugoslavia, 
arrived at Marseilles aboard the cruiser Dubrovnik, he was shot dead. The 
significance of the event, which took place in the afternoon of 9 October 1934 
– and in which the French foreign minister Barthou also perished – is yet to be 
recognized in the history of terrorism. It stimulated the first robust debate 
among states on the subject. The results of this debate, which took place within 
the premises of the League of Nations in Geneva, were the Convention for the 
Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism and the Convention for the Creation 
of an International Criminal Court.1 Together they laid the foundations of the 
first robust international regime to face the new ‘global’ threat of terrorism by 
means of globalized surveillance, normalized punishment of the terrorist, and 
discipline in terms of stipulating what was the proper state behavior with re-
spect to the terrorist threatening other sovereignties in the existing international 
political order (for an overview of the debate from a legal perspective see in 
particular Zlataric 1975; Saul 2006). 
The reason why the standard histories of terrorism tend to pass over the sub-
ject is twofold. First, it is because this regime, intended to fill a ‘gap in interna-
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tional organization,’2 failed to materialize. Indeed, the conventions, while 
signed by a number of parties, were not even ratified. The cause of this failure 
was the uncontrolled escalation of a systemic crisis that the regime was intend-
ed to contain – an argument developed in more detail below. The second reason 
has to do with the nature of these histories themselves. A distinct characteristic 
of many of them (e.g. Lacqueur 2001; Hoffman 2006; Rapoport, 2006) is a 
present concept of ‘terrorism’ projected backwards into the past. Such linear 
projection effectively endows ‘terrorism’ with a certain essential and eternal 
substance – and hence a spatio-temporal unity – while allowing for (evolving) 
mutability of only the accidental properties. In the period of the Marseilles 
assassination, these histories tend to focus on the ‘state terror’ in Bolshevik 
Russia or the ‘rising wave’ of ethnic nationalist terrorism in places such as 
Palestine, two phenomena constitutive for the resulting terrorism patchwork in 
which political assassinations also have their place, but only in the more distant 
past. 
This paper is grounded in a different approach. Its aim is to historicize ter-
rorism by focusing attention on how the current dominant discursive patterns, 
which are argued to constitute key elements of the ‘global terrorism’ disposi-
tive, have come into existence. The importance of the League of Nations debate 
as the first, and violent, Entstehung of ‘terrorism’ in the discourse among 
states, is beyond doubt when such a perspective is assumed. More specifically, 
the paper points to how ‘international terrorism’ in this debate was conceived 
of as a conspiracy, suggesting that it was precisely the conspiratorial relation-
ship between the terrorist and the revisionist state that defined the political 
violence constructed as terrorism as emergency. Terrorism was conceived of as 
a new and radical threat, first and foremost, because of this unholy alliance and 
because, as a consequence, it was conceived of as an instrument of state policy.  
2.  Terrorism as Conspiracy: Some Theoretical Reflections 
The particular strategy in which security is historicized by authors in this Spe-
cial Issue is through the introduction of states’ security dispositives and point-
ing to their close relationships to discourses of conspiracy. As De Graaf and 
Zwierlein (2013, in this HSR Special Issue) note, such discourses of conspiracy 
tend to be characterized, among other things, by the following. They are attrib-
utive (referring to another); they feature a strong transnational element (thus 
challenging the inside/outside as the defining logic of modern sovereignty as a 
producer of security); they have a potentially destructive effect on the current 
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social order (threatening its annihilation); they are ‘epistemologically impossi-
ble’; and they invoke a sense of urgency, immediacy and inevitability. 
All these features are present, as demonstrated in the empirical analysis be-
low, in the states’ discourse of terrorism in the 1930s. (The only qualification 
relates to the epistemological impossibility of proving the conspiracy, as it is 
suggested that conscious attempts to lay down evidence for its existence were 
made. However, while the production of this evidence meant to follow the 
criminal proceedings standards, it is suggested to be rather inadequate to 
‘prove’ the conspiracy to the extent imagined by those who postulated it.) The 
‘conspiracy’ – analyzed in functional rather than ‘truth’ categories – may thus 
be conceived of as orienting this historical discourse, which in turn seems to be 
genealogically related to the current discourse of terrorism as a constitutive 
element of the ‘global terrorism’ dispositive.  
While the analysis below seeks to point out the securitizing actors, how the 
referent subject is defined, the way it is perceived, the temporal relationship 
between the plot and the conspiracy discourse and the (conceived) new modes 
of security governance, emergency is not assumed in the dispositive claim to be 
related to sovereignty through politics of exception and decisionism (as the 
categories borrowed from the Copenhagen School conceptual apparatus might 
suggest). Instead, drawing on Foucault’s conception of the dispositive as a 
complex edifice (Foucault 2007, 8), it is assumed that in the ‘global terrorism’ 
dispositive different governmentalities (sovereignty, discipline, security, and 
biopolitics) are combined, producing an assemblage of both exceptional (war) 
and normalizing (administration, police) practices. Therefore, even though the 
role of sovereignty in the current security management apparatuses ought not to 
be underestimated (cf. Amoore and De Goede 2005; Amoore 2006; Butler 
2006; Aradau and Van Munster 2007; Bigo 2008), it is postulated that the 
exception invoked and legitimized by the discourse of conspiracy not only 
produces prohibition, coercion and punishment, but it also enters into a com-
plex relationship with the practices of normation. 
3.  Terrorism and the League of Nations 
From the formal point of view, the terrorism debate in the League of Nations 
can be divided in two stages: the immediate aftermath of the Marseilles assas-
sination, and the later period. The Marseilles events provoked a debate in the 
League’s Council, based on the request by Yugoslavia under Art. 11/2 of the 
Covenant, relating to a circumstance affecting international relations and 
threatens to disturb international peace.3 Based on a proposal submitted by 
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France, a decision was passed by the Council to create a committee of experts 
(representing their governments) that would prepare two conventions – one on 
the prevention and punishment of terrorism, the other on an international crim-
inal court. The Committee held three sessions (1934-1936), while terrorism 
was also discussed in parallel in the Assembly’s First Committee, and the 
League’s member states were asked three times to submit their written com-
ments. Finally, the diplomatic conference (with attendance not limited to the 
League’s members) was convened by the Council to discuss the two draft con-
ventions (1937).4  
The reasons why the case was successfully brought before the Council and 
why the statements in the first period betrayed a particular conspiratorial attrib-
ution to Hungary had to do with (Central) European alliance politics aimed at 
balancing Hungary’s and Bulgaria’s revisionist tendencies after WWI (support-
ed by Italy, which had an unresolved conflict with Yugoslavia over Dalmatia) – 
i.e. Little Entente and the Balkan Pact, both including Yugoslavia and both 
linked to France. All countries involved in these alliances supported Belgrade’s 
motion but France and Britain opposed involving Italy in the attribution moves 
(some of the conspirators in the Marseilles plot, namely Ante Pavelić and Eu-
gen Kvaternik, escaped to Italy in its aftermath where they continued to reside 
safely under the protection of the Fascist regime) as they were seeking at this 
time a rapprochement with Mussolini to balance the rise of Hitler’s Germany.  
What this ‘chessboard’ analysis fails to explain is why Marseilles, framed as 
‘terrorism’ – even though the concept had anything but a precise meaning in 
the general discourse at that time and before (used for actions violent and non-
violent; sustaining the state or undermining it; for breeches of the jus in bello, 
industrial actions or the local government inaction in enforcing a rule of law) – 
was brought before the League in the first place; why a debate of an unprece-
dented intensity followed; and why it culminated in developing a comprehen-
sive international regime to prevent and punish terrorism. Explanations for that 
are to be sought at the more abstract level of the international order. Emergence 
of the discourse of international terrorism in the aftermath of the Marseilles 
assassination may then be interpreted as a strategic response to the emergency 
caused by the general crisis of this order, and the envisioned regime then serv-
ing the purpose of preserving the hegemonically imposed and now crumbling 
status quo in terms of a particular political constellation by reinforcing the 
(imagined) unity in the face of a conspiratorial adversary and, in a broader 
sense, to prevent disintegration of the normative fundaments of this order and 
its slide into what Schmitt, somewhat bombastically, called a ‘global civil war’ 
(Schmitt 2003). Two paradoxes seem to have been entailed in this move. While 
the unprecedented threat that terrorism represented grew from the conspiracy 
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between the terrorist and the (revisionist) state, at the same time the former 
tended to be alienated from the ‘community of states’ standing for civilization 
and order (for example, by the trope of him “driving a wedge” into this com-
munity).5 Secondly, the counter-terrorism regime designed to check the pend-
ing international crisis grew out of the same (universalist) principles – support-
ed by the legal knowledge of ‘progressive codification of international law’ – 
that, at least in Schmitt’s analysis (Schmitt 2003, 227ff.), made the crisis possi-
ble in the first place. 
The conspiratorial elements featured in the debate throughout. In terms of 
attribution, the accusing statements in the first period, coming predominantly 
from the Little Entente countries, strove to establish a close cooperative rela-
tionship between the Ustaša (the terrorist organization) and Hungary (the state). 
What united the two schemers at the abstract level was the (alleged) intent to 
overthrow the existing state of affairs materialized in the national boundaries 
they both challenged,6 thus threatening anarchy and international chaos.7 The 
conspiratorial character of their association was forcefully asserted. Yugoslavia 
would describe the Marseilles events as “nothing but expression of a conspira-
cy against the integrity and security of the Yugoslav State, organised and fos-
tered by Hungary,” and a culmination of terrorism “inspired and abetted for 
years on Hungarian territory.”8 Czechoslovakia declared itself to be threatened 
by acts of terrorism as ‘individual invasion’ performed by the apparatus of the 
Hungarian state and its ‘associations’ abroad with the aim of undermining its 
territorial integrity.9 Thus the conspiracy’s reach was broadened and was not 
limited to the link between Hungarian government and the Croat nationalists. 
The revisionist state at the centre of the conspiracy, whose tentacles included 
minorities in the new states of Central Europe, nonetheless remained. 
Hungary’s involvement was established in two ways. Certain Hungarian 
army officers were alleged to collaborate directly with the Ustaša, providing its 
members with false passports and other material assistance. Moreover, ethnic 
Hungarian associations abroad, namely in Czechoslovakia, were directly linked 
to the government in Budapest in “a whole apparatus of conspiracy.”10 The 
evidence summoned to prove these claims drew mainly on two depositions 
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made in criminal proceedings by a certain Vinco Mihalus and Jelka Podgore-
lec.11 The second attribution of responsibility was indirect: it was simply in-
conceivable that Hungary had no knowledge of the terrorist ‘camps’ on its 
territory. The archetypical terrorist camp of the 1930s, Janka Puszta, a small 
farmstead located only a few miles from the Hungarian border with Yugosla-
via, could “not exist in an organised country without the consent and assistance 
of authorities.”12 Therefore, Budapest effectively provided the state territory as 
a base for terrorist activities abroad.  
As a result of a political compromise, in the final resolution by the Council 
it was not the Hungarian government but instead ‘certain authorities’ that were 
declared responsible for the Marseilles assassination. Moreover, Little En-
tente’s pressure notwithstanding, no supervision of measures to be taken by 
Hungary to suppress international terrorist activities was established. Instead, a 
comprehensive international regime was to be devised, and terrorism hence 
remained on the agenda of the League of Nations for three more years. While 
the debate was removed from the immediate context of the Marseilles event 
and hence attribution statements receded, other typical elements of the dis-
course of conspiracy were preserved.  
Terrorism would therefore be conceived of as a transnational phenomenon, 
defying the spatially delimited sovereignty on which the existing international 
order was based. In disguise and armed with false identity papers, the terrorist 
moved freely across the borders, not only threatening the political order inside 
and the peace outside, but also undermining the fundamental signification of 
the existing state power; a grid through which it could be interpreted. He inhab-
ited the dark side of globalization, preying on the increased structural vulnera-
bility of the international order caused by the growing international interde-
pendence13 and the “advancing knowledge and improved communications.”14 
The destructive capabilities of terrorism/the alliance between the terrorist 
and the revisionist state would be emphasized. In particular, what it threatened 
(and which was thus discursively securitized) was order and civilization. The 
Marseilles events brought about a ”state of anarchy and alarm in Europe”15 and 
could have far-reaching consequences in terms of making “organized govern-
ment impossible”.16 From the Little Entente’s perspective, the new political 
constellation following WWI finally brought justice to Europe by concluding 
the process of national unification as a “historic and inescapable necessity.” 
The conspiracy, resisting “irresistible natural forces”, was aimed at undermin-
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ing this new order and reversing the linear process toward freedom and peace 
to which national unification as “one of the laws governing the history of Eu-
rope” pointed.17 The primary referent object in the catastrophic visions given 
shape in the debate was the state (‘organized government’), a constituent unit 
of the international order which, if lack of discipline, poverty and suffering 
were to prevail inside the state boundaries18 (brought about inevitably through 
the involvement of another state), would perish too, taking civilization down 
with it. The destructive potential of the terrorist as modern barbarian was (dis-
cursively) reinforced by his location not ante portas of the civilized world, but 
– a courtesy of the conspiring state – inside it; and secondly, because the terror-
ist disrespected the elementary civilizational norms imposing limits on violence 
(thus being morally located in the past age of darkness) while, at the same time, 
benefiting from human progress and its technological achievements when 
constructing his diabolic machines. 
Pointing to the destructive capabilities of terrorism in combination with its 
transnational character would facilitate a rendering of the threat as particularly 
new and serious, and consequently warranting exceptional responses. Terror-
ism was something ‘entirely new in European public law’19 (understood in the 
broader sense of order, rather than a corpus of legislation) and it ushered in a 
period of “anarchy and international barbarism [which] would overwhelm the 
civilised world, in which the most elementary foundations of international 
peace would inevitably disappear.”20 No single state or alliance of states could 
defend itself against this contagion.21 Hence, a robust joint action, featuring 
elements of punishment, surveillance and discipline was necessary if there was 
any hope to be left for the “future of civilization”22 – the first “coalition against 
terrorism”. 
4.  Conclusion: Toward the Critique of the Global 
 Terrorism Dispositive 
The discourse on terrorism among states today, comprising statements enunci-
ated in the United Nations and elsewhere, features a strong conspiratorial char-
acter, repeating the tropes of attribution, transnationality and catastrophe en-
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countered in the 1930s debate. The adversary’s identity is again constituted in 
totality, threatening order, civilization and humanity. Thus it makes it possible 
to associate with terrorists, territorially dispersed actors of different kinds and 
diverse political agendas. “Despite the fact that terrorism is multifaceted, its 
nature is one and the same, and at its roots lies a doctrinaire egoism which has 
been raised by its followers to the highest level of evil, intolerance and cruel-
ty.”23 It is once more posited as a new and unprecedented threat (“the greatest 
of new dangers”);24 a ‘scourge’ (a term familiar in the 1930s debate) disturbing 
the conscience of the (ordered, civilized and human) world. The emergency 
produced by the terrorist conspiracy is most significantly the consequence of 
the terrorist’s negation of both spatial and moral limits. Terrorism knows no 
boundaries or nationality, spreading to all corners of the world and making no 
country, including great powers, immune against its strike.25 The lack of im-
munity is a recurring moment in the discourse, constituting part and parcel of a 
broader set of statements made by the states about terrorism as disease – either 
cancer or plague (stressing its contagious nature and uncontrollable spread)26 
or madness (pointing to its irrationality, again transferrable to those so far 
sane).27 Terrorism also transgresses the (civilizational) norms on the limits of 
violence, once more benefiting in its own malign way from the forces of pro-
gress, most notably through (the catastrophic possibility of) the use of weapons 
of mass destruction (cf. Cameron 2004).  
Two important discontinuities between the 1930s and the current discourse 
seem to emerge, however. First, the character of the terrorist conspiracy is 
altered insofar as its fundamental feature – and an emergency ‘propeller’ – is 
not the unholy alliance between the terrorist and a (revisionist) state. No longer 
is the terrorist an extended instrument of state policy. Indeed, the rogue states 
of today can unproblematically be associated with the global terrorist move-
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ment; yet they do not appear necessary for its function. The terrorist conspiracy 
is ‘real’, its dominantly rendered morphology being one of a transnational 
network28 penetrating through the national boundaries and negating the differ-
ence between external and internal security. (Alternatively, it is imagined as an 
octopus, with its “destructive tentacles” reaching to all societies.29) But it can 
do without the conspiring state. Moreover, unlike in the 1930s the possibility of 
state failure as a facilitating condition for the terrorist to thrive is not only ac-
cepted, but must be actively eliminated. The failed state is constituted as a ‘sick 
man’ of the normal international order which needs to be cured through ‘state-
building’ to prevent the contagion of terrorism from taking root there and 
metastizing further. 
Second, this discourse is now a constitutive element of what I suggest is a 
‘global terrorism’ dispositive, a developed ensemble of discursive and nondis-
cursive practices which comprises both the more conventionally ‘exceptional’ 
practices of war, ‘regime change’, ‘state-building’ and reducing the terrorist to 
‘bare life’ in the camp (Butler 2002, cf. Agamben 1998); preemptive risk man-
agement techniques for governing mobilities in the neoliberal economy through 
the emergence of a biometric state (Amoore 2006; Aradau and Van Munster 
2007; De Goede 2008); and the multitude of practices at the new nexi of geo-
politics and biopolitics (Dillon 2007; Kiersey and Stokes 2010), and surveil-
lance and discipline (Lyon 2003; Bigo 2008). All these components, variably 
impressing on states, populations or individual human bodies (whether the 
citizen’s, migrant’s, or terrorist’s) are strategically arranged through the con-
cept of ‘terrorism’ and legitimized with reference to the catastrophic possibility 
of a future terror event (cf. Aradau and Van Munster 2011; on temporality and 
conspiracy see also Zwierlein, in this HSR Special Issue). 
To posit the existence of such a ‘global terrorism’ dispositive is not to posit 
a grand design behind it and create a monstrous, monumental unity where there 
is none. Indeed, the dispositive as conceived by Foucault is a strategic response 
to emergency (cf. Agamben 2009), and there is an overall rationality in orient-
ing, through the dispositive, the multiplicity of forces in the social field. But as 
power is subjectless and tactically polyvalent, this can only be a rationality of a 
‘machine’ (Kelly 2009, 46). Historicizing the constitutive elements of this 
dispositive is therefore not intended to decapitate the tyrannical sovereign; but 
rather to make, with Foucault, “facile gestures difficult” (Foucault 1988, 155) 
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and to engage in the continuous process of liberation from the straitjacket that 
this machine imposes on our political possibilities.  
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